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Abstract 
Politicization has largely been studied in the field of civil service. Party influence on the 
judiciary, however, has widely been neglected, even though patronage appointments to the 
courts fundamentally challenge the independence of the judiciary and raise questions about 
the separation of powers in modern democracies. What factors explain the variation in the 
politicization of the judiciary in European democracies? A set of explanatory factors 
including the presence of robust political competition, the nature of the executive, the level of 
judicial activism, the presence of an independent body for judicial review, and the legal 
regulation of parties are tested in a comparative study of 16 European countries. The study 
draws on literature of political science, public administration, and law and provides an 
empirical contribution to the study of party patronage and its prevalence in European 
judiciaries. The results suggest that countries with less government alternation and a tradition 
of coalition governments tend to have a less politicized judiciary. In contrast, countries with 
more active courts, an independent body for judicial review, and a party law regulating the 
organization, behavior, and activities of political parties were found to have more politicized 
judiciaries. 
 
Key words: politicization, judiciary, party patronage, judicial activism. 
 
 
Introduction 
One of the central concerns in the 2016 United States (US) presidential election was the 
appointment of judges to the Supreme Court. Power to appoint a member to the highest 
federal court in the US means power to influence future court rulings on strongly contentious 
issues such as abortion or gay marriage. While the appointment of Supreme Court judges is 
probably the example of politicization of the judiciary receiving the most attention by the 
public and academia, this phenomenon is by far not limited to the US. In contrast, party 
control in this area is equally prevalent in the European context (Kopecký et al. 2012, 2016), 
preceded by an increase in politicization of the public administration (Page and Wright 1999; 
Peters and Pierre 2004). The politicization of the judiciary is an area deserving particular 
attention as it raises important questions about how the relationship between the branches of 
power in modern democracies should be balanced (Domingo 2004) and how politicization 
affects judicial independence (Uelmen 1997). Patronage appointments to the courts 
fundamentally challenge the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch. 
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Moreover, political appointments to the judiciary shed light on motivations and strategic 
choices of political parties. In an area of decreasing links between the society and parties on 
one hand and growing state-party linkages on the other (Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen 
2004; van Biezen and Kopecký 2014), the courts may be just another organizational resource 
for political parties to ensure their power and position. 
So far, empirical studies have covered party patronage on a wide spectrum of state 
institutions, providing an aggregate picture of the patronage practices in a number of 
European states (Kopecký et al. 2012; Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012; Volintiru 2015). 
Empirical evidence collected by Kopecký et al. (2012) indicates that the level of politicization 
of the judiciary varies greatly across European countries. However, little has been done to 
explore the factors explaining the variation across European democracies in a comparative 
framework. This project aims to address this gap in knowledge by providing a systematic 
analysis of the phenomenon and giving answer to the following research question: What 
factors explain the variation in the politicization of the judiciary in European democracies? 
The study addresses this question by testing the explanatory power of factors 
regarding the nature of the party system and the executive as well as the status of the judiciary 
and judicial behavior. More specifically, the effect of robust political competition, the 
tradition of government, the level of judicial activism, the presence of an independent body 
for judicial review, and the legal regulation of political parties on the level of politicization of 
the judiciary is explored. This study thus contributes to the theoretical work on the role of 
parties in contemporary democracies and links literature of political science, public 
administration, and law. It enriches the empirical research on party patronage and state-party 
linkages as well as the role, status, and behavior of courts by systematically exploring which 
factors explain the variation in the politicization of the judiciary in European democracies. 
The results of the bivariate analysis indicate that countries with less government alternation 
and a tradition of coalition governments tend to have a less politicized judiciary. In contrast, 
countries with more active courts, an independent body for judicial review, and a party law 
regulating the organization, behavior, and activities of political parties were found to have 
more politicized judiciaries. 
 
Conceptual and theoretical background 
Considering the various conceptualizations of politicization offered by the political science 
and public administration literature, an important starting point is to identify the meaning of 
the term in this study and to outline how it differs from other related concepts in the field 
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(Kopecký and Mair 2012; Kopecký and Scherlis 2008). Politicization is here understood as an 
outcome of parties “capturing” the state by party patronage. Party patronage is defined as “the 
allocation of jobs in the public and semi-public sectors at the discretion of political parties” 
(van Biezen and Kopecký 2014: 176). The concept is to be distinguished from another 
understanding of patronage as an electoral resource, i.e. “an exchange of public goods for 
electoral support” (Kopecký and Mair 2012: 4), closely related to the term clientelism. 
Clientelism is the exchange of benefits for political support between a patron and a client, i.e. 
individuals or clearly defined groups (Hopkin 2006). In contrast to clientelism, party 
patronage is less motivated by rewards and benefits but by gaining control (Kopecký and 
Scherlis 2008: 358). It is thus an organizational resource, i.e. “a form of institutional […] 
exploitation that operates to the benefit of the party organization” (Kopecký and Mair 2012: 
7). Parties exert control over the allocation of positions in various branches of the 
bureaucracy, across all sorts of policy areas, and in a wide range of institutions (Kopecký et 
al. 2012). By controlling the recruitment to public and semi-public positions, political parties 
enhance their information status, ensure their control of policy-making and implementation, 
and improve their reputation (Kopecký and Mair 2012: 10).  
As the process and outcomes of policy-making may become subject to judicial 
scrutinizing, political parties may attempt “to control the judicial watchmen” by influencing 
who gets appointed to central positions in the judicial system, resulting in the politicization of 
the judiciary (Domingo 2004: 111). A judiciary is considered highly politicized when judges 
are appointed by the executive based on partisan and ideological factors instead of 
qualifications and merit (Weiden 2011: 336). Although it is rather unlikely in the context of 
European democracies that judges are appointed without fulfilling the requirements 
concerning their qualification, party influence may take a more subtle form. Party patronage 
occurs when other factors in addition to and beyond professional qualifications have played a 
role in the appointment such as personal loyalty and trust (John and Poguntke 2012: 126; 
Meyer-Sahling 2006; Meyer-Sahling and Jáger 2012). 
Case studies exploring the politicization of the civil service as well as literature in the 
legal field have identified a range of factors potentially causing the phenomenon. This 
research will draw on these insights and test the explanatory power of the factors for the 
politicization of the judiciary. One set of arguments deals with the party system and the role 
of the opposition within it. Grzymala-Busse (2007) and O’Dwyer (2006) argue that political 
competition reduces not only corruption but also patronage appointments. Competition will, 
however, only constrain patronage when it involves fairly stable and institutionalized political 
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parties (Kopecký 2011). Moreover, robust competition involves critical oppositions 
monitoring the government and thus providing incentives for the government to refrain from 
exploiting the state (Grzymala-Busse 2007; O’Dwyer 2006). As for patronage appointments 
in general, robust political competition is also expected to moderate the politicization of the 
judiciary. Being monitored by a critical and coherent opposition, government parties may 
engage less in patronage appointments to the courts to avoid getting pointed out in public for 
undermining the independence of the judiciary for their interests.  
 
H1: Politicization of the judiciary is lower in countries with robust political 
competition. 
 
Moreover, the nature of the executive may influence how much control parties exert over the 
appointments of judges. Analyzing the strategic considerations in hiring and firing cabinet 
ministers, Dowding and Dumont (2009) argue that party political constraints differ greatly for 
single-party majority in contrast to coalition governments. In single-party majority 
governments, the power to allocate positions in the state apparatus is not shared among 
several parties. The party in office is thus not bound to another party’s approval when 
recruiting personnel. In coalition governments, on the other hand, personnel decisions are 
subject to negotiations between coalition partners. Coalition parties can hold each other 
accountable and possibly veto personnel decisions of their coalition partners, whether it is a 
decision regarding an appointment to a ministerial position or to a job in the civil service. 
Moreover, parties in coalition governments may appoint “watchdog” junior ministers to 
monitor each other’s cabinet ministers (Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Martin and Vanberg 
2011; Thies 2001; Verzichelli 2008), rendering it difficult for top-level politicians to hide 
patronage practices from their coalition partners and to make political appointments solely 
based on ideological preferences. Similarly, van den Berg (2011) suggests that bureaucracies 
in countries with a tradition of majoritarian governments tend to be more politicized than 
those in countries with a tradition of coalition or consensus governments.  
Following this line of reasoning, in countries in which coalition governments 
dominate, the opportunity for judicial appointments based on partisan or ideological factors 
should also be reduced. This, in turn, should be reflected in the level of politicization of the 
judiciary. In other words, judiciaries in countries with a tradition of single-party majority 
governments are expected to be more politicized than those in countries with a tradition of 
coalition governments. 
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H2: Politicization of the judiciary is higher in countries with a tradition of single-party 
majority governments than in those with a tradition of coalition governments. 
 
The next set of arguments shifts the focus towards characteristics of the judiciary and deals 
with differences in the legal culture and the status of the judiciary across European 
democracies. Following Blankenburg (1998: 39), legal cultures “are characterized by 
indicators of institutions as well as behavior”. A key concept when examining the institutional 
status of the judiciary and judicial behavior in a country is judicial activism. The term was 
originally coined by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (1947) who divided the US Supreme Court 
Justices at that time in “judicial activists” and “advocates of judicial self-restraint” (quoted in 
Kmiec 2004: 1446). Although the concept has been widely used in the legal discourse, it often 
remains poorly defined (Kmiec 2004: 1443). As Cross and Lindquist (2007: 1755) note, “[i]n 
many cases, complaints about judicial activism only reflect an amorphous lament about 
disfavored Court decisions.” In an extensive review of the historical and contemporary usage 
of the term, Kmiec (2004: 1444) identifies five core meanings of judicial activism, i.e. “(1) 
invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions of other branches, (2) failure to adhere to 
precedent, (3) judicial ‘legislation,’ (4) departures from accepted interpretive methodology, 
and (5) result-oriented judging.”  
The focus of this study lies on the first core meaning of the term, i.e. overturning the 
acts and decisions of the executive and legislative branch. Invalidation of legislative 
enactments is considered the “conventional standard” of examining judicial activism (Cross 
and Lindquist 2007: 1759). For a court to be “active” in this sense, it has to be granted the 
formal right to judicial review by the constitution and then to also act on it. Lijphart (2012: 
214) argues that the “impact of judicial review depends only partly on its formal existence and 
much more vitally on the vigor and frequency of its use by the courts”. Courts may also 
engage in judicial self-restraint instead of activism although provided with the formal power 
to do so (Herron and Randazzo 2003). The more the courts interfere with political decision-
making and engage in judicial review as “watchmen”, the greater the motivation for political 
parties to influence who is holding positions in the judiciary and the higher the level of 
politicization. 
 
H3a: The higher the level of judicial activism in a country, the higher the level of 
politicization of the judiciary. 
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If an independent body instead of the ordinary courts has the authority over judicial review, 
one speaks of centralized systems of judicial review (Lijphart 2012: 213). Such institutions 
are highly involved with political decision-making as they rule on whether laws challenged by 
political or non-political actors are in conflict with the constitution. They have the power to 
overrule legislation by the governing parties and have thus become major political players 
(Domingo 2004: 108). In some instances, they are even considered policy-makers themselves 
(Dahl 1957; Lhotta 2003). Governments in countries that have an independent body for 
judicial review may therefore have greater incentives to exert influence over the appointments 
of judges to ensure court rulings in their favor. 
 
H3b: Politicization of the judiciary is higher when an independent body for judicial 
review is present in the country. 
 
In some countries, judicial interference with political parties does not only take the form of 
evaluating the constitutionality of legislative decisions but touches the very nature of party 
organization and political competition by interpreting party law, i.e. “legal regulation 
specifically directed at political parties as organizations […] which make a textual reference 
to political parties in their title (e.g. Law on Political Parties, Party Law)” (Casal-Bértoa et al. 
2012: 3). Such laws consist of rules concerning several dimensions of parties, including how 
they are defined, structured, and financed as well as regulations of their program and activities 
(Piccio 2012; van Biezen and Rashkova 2014). Party laws may also create a “monitoring and 
sanctioning regime to supervise party activity and impose penalties for violations of the law” 
(Van Biezen and Kopecký 20014: 176). By interpreting party law, courts shape political 
competition and the nature of the party system as they may allow or prohibit parties from 
entering the political arena (Gauja 2014). In a comparative study of 33 post-war European 
countries, van Biezen and Rashkova (2014) find that legal regulation of political parties has a 
negative effect on the number of new entries to the party system. Judicial regulation of 
political parties is thus likely to affect the strategic choices of political parties. Parties are 
expected to react to legal interference with their organization, behavior, and activities by 
trying to exerting greater control over the selection of judges who interpret party law.  
 
H4: Politicization of the judiciary is higher in countries which have a party law than in 
those without such legal regulation of party organizations. 
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The next section outlines the research design of this study, briefly discussing the case 
selection, explaining the operationalization of the explanatory factors and the methodology 
and data used to test them. 
 
Research design 
To answer the question what factors explain the variation in the politicization of the judiciary 
in European democracies, the following 16 countries will be included in this study: Austria, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The countries 
are selected due to availability of comparable data on the dependent variable.   
 
Dependent variable 
To operationalize the dependent variable, i.e. the level of politicization of the judiciary, data 
collected for the book Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies 
edited by Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova (2012) are used and complemented with data collected 
by Volintiru (2015) for Romania. The authors measured the level of politicization in each 
country with the Index of Party Patronage (IPP) which is calculated by using the median 
values for the range and depth of patronage in nine policy areas (i.e. Economy, Finance, 
Judiciary, Media, Military and Police, Foreign Service, Culture and Education, Health Care, 
and Regional and Local Administration) and three institutional types (i.e. ministerial 
departments, non-departmental agencies and commissions, and executing institutions). For the 
purpose of this study, the IPP is disaggregated to single out the level of politicization in the 
area of interest, i.e. the judiciary. The IPP ranges from 0, corresponding to complete absence 
of patronage practices, to 1 which indicates a full overlap of party and the state. Intermediate 
values are interpreted as follows. In general, a score of around 0.65 indicates that parties exert 
control over appointments in most institutions at all levels of the administration, a score of 
approximately 0.4 corresponds to partisan appointments in most institutions but only at top 
and middle levels, whereas a score of 0.1 means that party patronage occurs in a limited 
number of institutions and only at the top level. In the context of this study, a value of 0.4 thus 
translates to political appointments to top-level positions in the judiciary such as the chairman 
of court or senior judges, as well as middle positions in most of the national courts and the 
national ministry of justice. Scores on the bottom of the scale indicate that political parties are 
mostly uninvolved in the appointments to the judiciary. 
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Independent variables 
Robust political competition is operationalized with the Government Turnover Index (GTI) by 
Ieraci (2012). Alternation of government is considered a “fundamental component of any 
efficient democracy” and “an ideal pattern of competition” (Ieraci 2012: 530). The GTI is 
calculated by dividing the net party changes in the governments by the total number of 
governments. The score for Iceland was computed by the author using the same method. The 
variable is continuous, ranging from 0 to 1. Higher levels of government turnover indicate 
more robust political competition. A value of 1 would mean that the composition of 
government fully changed in every new government. Scores represent patterns of political 
competition as they are average levels of government turnover scores over a time span of 15 
years (1996-2010).  
The nature of the executive is coded as a binary variable with 0 corresponding to a 
tradition of coalition governments and 1 corresponding to a tradition of single-party majority 
governments. The Comparative Political Data Set compiled by Armingeon et al. (2016) at the 
University of Berne provides data on the types of government from 1960 to 2014. When the 
majority of governments were coalition governments or single-party minority governments, 
the variable has a value of 0. Single-party minority governments are included in this category 
as they depend on the support of other parties represented in parliament and thus technically 
govern as coalition governments. Thus, for example, Denmark has a score of 0. When the 
majority of governments were single-party majority governments, the variable obtains a score 
of 1. Pre-electoral alliances gaining the majority of votes by running on one party ticket and 
subsequently governing alone were also classified as single-party governments (this is mostly 
the case in Bulgaria). The scores are checked for consistency with classifications in the 
political science literature. Spain represents a unique case of having a mix of single-party 
majority and very strong single-party minority governments but was classified as majoritarian 
after consulting a country expert. 
To operationalize the level of judicial activism, the Index of Judicial Review by 
Lijphart (2012) is used. The index is a “fourfold classification of the strength of judicial 
review based, first, on the distinction between the presence and absence of judicial review, 
and, second, on three degrees of activism in the assertion of this power by the courts” 
(Lijphart 2012: 214). The original index ranging from 1 to 4 was recoded to range from 0 to 3 
with higher values indicating higher levels of judicial activism to make the interpretation 
clearer. More specifically, a score of 0 corresponds to lack of the right of judicial review and 
thus complete absence of judicial activism, whereas scores of 1, 2, and 3 correspond to weak, 
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medium-strength, and strong judicial activism. The scores of the Eastern European countries 
were retrieved from Bernauer and Vatter (2009) who collected the data to complement 
Lijphart’s index. Presence of an independent body of judicial review is measured with a 
binary variable with 0 corresponding to absence and 1 corresponding to presence thereof. 
Data on each country is retrieved from the Comparative Political Data Set. Legal regulation 
of political parties is represented by a binary variable with the absence of a party law being 
coded as 0 and presence thereof as 1. All party laws are available online on the website of the 
Party Law in Modern Europe research project by van Biezen (2013).  
 
Method of analysis 
To explore which factors explain the variation in the level of politicization of European 
judiciaries, the bivariate relationships between the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables will be examined. Unit of analysis is the country. For all categorical 
variables, mean levels of politicization of the judiciary will be compared and contrasted 
between groups using independent-samples t-tests or one-way ANOVA when appropriate. For 
the continuous variables, correlations will be computed. Moreover, effect sizes will be 
calculated to assess the substantive importance of each independent variable and to allow for 
a comparison of magnitudes of effects. As Feinn and Sullivan (2012: 279-280) correctly point 
out, “a statistical test [with a sufficiently large sample] will almost always demonstrate a 
significant difference”; thus, “both the substantive significance (effect size) and statistical 
significance (P value) are essential results to be reported.” Finally, the statistical analysis will 
be complemented with country-specific contextual background.  
 
Analysis and results  
In a first step, some descriptive statistics were computed to get a general picture of the sample 
in this study. The starting point of this study was the empirical observation of a great variation 
in the level of politicization of the judiciary across European democracies. Figure 1 displays 
the distribution of the dependent variable in a bar chart. Overall, the IPP scores for the 
judiciaries in this sample range between 0.00 and 0.58 with an average score of 0.32 (SD = 
0.16). Five countries in this sample, i.e. Germany, Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal, have 
an IPP score of 0.4 or higher, thus being characterized by a relatively highly politicized 
judiciary. Notably, three of four Southern European countries in the sample are included in 
this group of countries at the top of the ranking; only Italy has a slightly less politicized 
judiciary (0.37). The Netherlands and Denmark, in contrast, rank very low in their respective 
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level of politicization of the judiciary, with the latter even obtaining the lowest possible score, 
indicating complete absence of party influence from the judiciary at all levels. The four 
Central and Eastern European countries in this sample, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Romania, all rank very closely to each other, ranging in their absolute IPP 
values only between 0.23 (Romania) and 0.37 (Czech Republic) with a mean score of 0.30. In 
contrast, the average score of the Western European countries in this sample is 0.33. Thus, the 
level of politicization in both regions is quite similar, albeit judiciaries in Western Europe 
seem to be slightly more politicized.  
 
 
Figure 1: Bar chart of the level of politicization of the judiciary by country. 
Note: Scores are IPP values for the judiciary. Mean = 0.32; standard deviation = 0.16. 
 
In terms of robust political competition, the countries in this sample cover a slightly larger 
range. The average level of political competition measured with the Government Turnover 
Index in this sample is 0.41 (SD = 0.19). Bulgaria has the highest government turnover with a 
score of 0.89, meaning that, on average, 89% of the party composition in government changed 
with a new government being formed. Denmark has the lowest government turnover with a 
score of 0.14, indicating that an average of only 14% of the governing parties was replaced in 
new governments. Twelve of the countries in this sample have a tradition of coalition 
governments whereas four cases, i.e. Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom, have 
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a tradition of majoritarian governments, meaning that governments are typically of the single-
party majority type. 
The median level of judicial activism is “weak” with seven out of 16 countries 
obtaining a score of 1 on the scale. Five countries fall in the category of medium-strength 
activism of the courts while two are characterized by a strong degree of judicial activism. In 
the remaining two countries, i.e. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, judicial activism is 
completely absent, indicated by a score of 0. The Dutch constitution directly precludes the 
right to judicial review of parliamentary acts and treaties (Lijphart 2012: 213). Judges may 
only rule parliamentary acts to be incompatible with international treaties (Blankenburg 1998: 
39). The United Kingdom has an “unwritten” or uncodified constitution and the British 
parliament enjoys uncontested sovereignty, with the only exception of being bound by EU 
law or the European Convention on Human Rights (Delaney 2014). 
Exactly half of the countries included in this study have an independent body for 
judicial review, i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and 
Spain. Establishing its constitutional court in 1920, Austria was the first country worldwide to 
develop a centralized judicial review system (Paulson 2003). The Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany, however, is considered one of the most powerful constitutional courts in 
the world (Kommers 1994: 47; Vanberg 2005: 17) and said to have “profoundly changed the 
perception of law and politics as being two separate arenas of decision-making” (Blankenburg 
1998: 39). The remaining eight countries in which no independent body for judicial review is 
present classify as decentralized judicial review systems according to Lijphart (2012). 
About two-thirds of the countries in this sample have a party law which legally 
regulates the organization, activity, and behavior of political parties (62.5%), whereas six out 
of 16 countries do not. In this sample, Germany, Portugal, Austria, and Spain were the first 
countries to legally regulate political parties, adopting a party law in 1967, 1974, 1975, and 
1978 respectively. After the end of the communist regime, all of the Eastern European 
countries in this sample adopted a party law, modeling the legal documents on the German 
Parteiengesetz (Casal-Bértoa et al. 2012: 6). 
 
The role of party system and type of government  
The first set of factors expected to influence the level of politicization of the judiciary is 
related to the party system and the tradition of government. Hypothesis 1 stated that 
judiciaries in countries with more robust political competition are expected to be less 
politicized than those in countries with low political competition. To visualize the relationship 
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between robust political competition and politicization of the judiciary, a scatterplot was 
created (see Figure 2). The plot indicates a positive relationship between the two variables. A 
Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to further assess the relationship. The result 
suggest a weak, positive correlation between the two variables, r = .30, p = .27. Thus, the 
relationship does not go in the expected direction of Hypothesis 1. In contrast, more robust 
political competition correlates with higher levels of politicization of the judiciary. However, 
the results have to be interpreted with caution as the effect is not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of the relationship between politicization of the judiciary and robust 
political competition measured with the Government Turnover Index. 
 
One reason for the unexpected results could be that the measurement may have not fully 
captured the concept of robust political competition. A score of 0.5, for example, could mean 
that half of the party composition changed in every new government or complete alternation 
in half of all governments. The GTI thus only gives an aggregate picture which may be 
slightly misleading. Another possible reason may be that the theoretical consideration 
underlying the relationship between robust political competition and politicization has to be 
reversed. Instead of limiting politicization by ensuring mutual control of government and 
opposition, robust political competition may lead political parties to seek greater influence on 
the judiciary to establish some form of institutional power which continues after exiting the 
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government. Each governing party may thus aim to maximize its use of the judiciary as an 
organizational resource during the time in office. 
 
The nature of the executive 
The second hypothesis expected the level of politicization of the judiciary to be higher in 
countries with a tradition of single-party majority governments than in those with a tradition 
of coalition governments. Figure 3 visualizes the mean level of politicization of the judiciary 
for both groups of countries in a box plot. Countries with a tradition of coalition governments 
have an average IPP score of 0.31 (SD = 0.17, n = 12). The mean level of politicization of the 
judiciary increases to 0.37 (SD = 0.13, n = 4) for countries with a tradition of single-party 
majority governments. After establishing that heteroscedasticity was very unlikely in the data 
using a Levene’s test, F(1) = 0.37, p = .56, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to 
compare the level of politicization in countries with a tradition of coalition governments and 
those with a tradition of majoritarian governments (equal variances assumed). There was no 
significant difference between the two groups, t(14) = -0.59, p = .56. Moreover, the effect size 
calculated using the raw mean scores, standard deviations, and group sizes was also rather 
small in substantial terms, d = -0.37, r = -.16. Nevertheless, the effect goes in the expected 
direction of Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
Figure 3: Box plot of the mean level of politicization of the judiciary grouped by the tradition 
of government. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that the nature of the party system as well as the type of 
government may play a role in explaining variation in the politicization of European 
judiciaries, albeit likely a small one. Although conventional levels of significance were not 
met, the effect of the tradition of government goes in the hypothesized direction, whereas the 
effect of political competition does not. Comparing the magnitude of the correlation 
coefficient of robust political competition and the effect size of governmental tradition, the 
former factor seems to have a more important influence than the latter.  
 
The impact of judicial activism and legal regulation of parties 
The second set of expectations deals with the status and strength of the judiciary. In countries 
in which judicial activism is strong, the level of politicization of the courts was hypothesized 
to be higher than in countries with lower levels of judicial activism. Figure 4 displays the 
relationship between the two variables in a box plot. The plot shows the mean levels of 
politicization for each category of judicial activism to allow a comparison between the 
groups.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Box plot of the mean level of politicization of the judiciary grouped by the level of 
judicial activism. 
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Countries in which judicial activism is completely absent have an average IPP score of 0.13 
(SD = 0.08, n = 2). The mean level of politicization of the judiciary increases for countries 
with courts that have a weak level of activism, M = 0.30, SD = 0.18, n = 7. Countries in the 
third category, i.e. the medium-strength judicial activism, have an even higher mean IPP score 
of 0.39 (SD = 0.06, n = 5). Finally, those countries with very strongly active courts are also 
those with the highest average level of politicization of the judiciary, M = 0.42, SD = 0.23, n = 
2. After testing for homogeneity of variance (F(3) = 3.20, p = .06), a one-way independent 
ANOVA was carried out to check whether the differences between the categories of judicial 
activism are significant, F(3) = 1.75, p = .21. The results do not reach conventional standards 
of significance, indicating that the groups do not differ significantly. This is most likely due to 
methodological reasons; the number of observations in each category is very low and thus 
makes it difficult to achieve robust results. However, there seems to be a trend in the data 
considering two observations. First, the mean level of politicization of the judiciary increases 
with the level of judicial activism. Second, the differences between the groups are substantial 
effects: The difference between absence of judicial activism and weak activism is a medium-
sized to large effect, d = -1.00, r = -.39, and the difference between the category weak and 
medium-strength activism is a slightly weaker but still moderate effect, d = -0.62, r = -.29, 
whereas the difference between the medium-strength and strongly activist courts is a small 
effect, d = -0.23, r = -.10. This trend is confirmed after splitting the countries in only two 
categories of judicial activism, i.e. assigning those with a score of 0 or 1 to “low” activism 
and those with a score of 2 or 3 to “high” activism. Again, the average level of politicization 
of the judiciary is higher in countries with more active courts, M = 0.40, SD = 0.10, n = 7, 
than in those with less or non-active courts, M = 0.27, SD = 0.18, n = 9. The difference 
between the two groups is a quite substantial medium-sized to large effect, d = -0.93, r = -.42. 
Thus, although the results have to be interpreted cautiously, the effect of judicial 
activism on the level of politicization of the judiciary goes in the expected direction of 
Hypothesis 3a. A more active role of the judiciary indeed seems to correlate with greater 
influence of political parties on the appointment of judges. The results also indicate that courts 
with a medium and large activist role show similar levels of politicization. It is thus plausible 
that there is some form of ceiling effect; after reaching a medium level of judicial activism, 
courts may be considered a potential organizational resource and become subject to increased 
party patronage. It may then be of less importance whether courts take up a moderate or very 
active role since they are already perceived as a source of institutional power.  
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Presence of an independent body for judicial review 
Hypothesis 3b suggested that countries with a centralized system of judicial review, i.e. those 
in which interpreting the constitutionality of acts and decisions of the governments are 
delegated to an independent body, have a more politicized judiciary than those without such 
an institution. On average, the data indicate that judiciaries in countries which have an 
independent body for judicial review indeed are more politicized than judiciaries in 
decentralized systems of judicial review. Figure 5 displays the results in a boxplot. In 
countries with no independent body for judicial review, the average IPP score is 0.26 (SD = 
0.18, n = 8). In countries with such an institution, the mean IPP score is 0.39 (SD = 0.11, n = 
8). The results support Hypothesis 3b which expected the level of politicization of the 
judiciary to be higher in countries with an independent body for judicial review.  
 
 
Figure 5: Box plot of the mean level of politicization of the judiciary grouped by presence of 
an independent body for judicial review. 
 
As a Levene’s test found that heteroscedasticity was unlikely within the data, F(1) = 1.62, p = 
.22, an independent-samples t-test assuming equal variances was conducted to test for 
differences between countries with an independent body for judicial review and those without 
such an institution, t(14) = -1.63, p = .13. The results suggest that the two groups of countries 
do not differ significantly from each other. In substantial terms, however, the difference 
between the two groups is a considerable moderate to large effect, d = -0.85, r = -.39. Thus, 
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although the difference in the level of politicization of the judiciary between the centralized 
and decentralized systems of judicial review does not reach statistical significance, the effect 
size indicates that the factor is not to be disregarded.  
A brief look at Table 1 shows that the three countries with an IPP score below 0.20, 
i.e. Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK, do not have an independent body for judicial 
review. Those with a score above 0.4, however, do not all have such an institution. In 
contrast, two out of the five countries with highly politicized judiciaries, i.e. Ireland and 
Greece, have a decentralized system of judicial review. Taking into consideration that the 
judiciaries of those two countries are also classified as weak in terms of judicial activism, it 
appears as that the variables capturing the status and behavior of the courts in this study fall 
short of explaining the magnitude of political influence on the appointments of judges in 
Ireland and Greece. 
 
Legal regulation of political parties by party law 
The presence of party law explicitly regulating the endeavor of political parties was chosen as 
another indicator for a high level of judicial interference. A box plot was created to compare 
means of politicization of the judiciary between the group of countries having a party law and 
those that do not (see Figure 6). Countries in which parties are not regulated by a party law 
have an average IPP score of 0.27 (SD = 0.21, n = 6), whereas the mean for those countries 
with a party law is 0.35 (SD = 0.12, n = 10). This indicates that, overall, judiciaries in 
countries with legal party regulation tend to be more politicized than those with no such legal 
constraints on party behavior, providing support for Hypothesis 4.  
A Levene’s test found that the assumption of homogeneity of variance between groups 
was not violated, F(1) = 4.22, p = .06; therefore, an independent-samples t-test assuming 
equal variances was carried out to test whether mean levels of politicization of the judiciary 
between countries with a party law and those without differ significantly, t(14) = -0.96, p = 
.35. The results indicate that the groups differed not significantly from each other. The 
magnitude of the effect was weak to moderate, d = -0.51, r = -.24. A closer look at the ranking 
of the countries displayed in Table 1 reveals the ambiguous role of party law. On one hand, 
Iceland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, taking up the lowest ranks of politicization of the 
judiciary in this sample besides the UK, have no party law interfering with the organization of 
political parties. The country with the highest level of politicization of the judiciary, i.e. 
Germany, is also considered “the heartland of party law”, surpassing all other democracies in 
the extent to which “political parties are subjected to […] detailed explicit regulation” (Müller  
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Figure 6: Box plot of the mean level of politicization of the judiciary grouped by presence of 
a party law. 
 
and Sieberer 2005: 435). Moreover, all four countries which adopted party laws the earliest, 
i.e. Germany, Portugal, Austria, and Spain, have highly politicized judiciaries with an IPP 
score of close to 0.4 or higher. On the other hand, Greece and Ireland also do not regulate 
parties by the means of party laws but also have an IPP score of 0.4 or higher, thus ranking 
amongst the countries with the highest politicized judiciaries. Furthermore, the UK with a 
very low score of 0.19 has adopted its first party law in 1998. As the name already gives 
away, the Registration of Political Parties Act, however, only deals with the registration of 
parties and is very limited in its regulative character (Piccio 2012: 87). Legal regulation of 
political parties only expanded later with the 2000 Political Parties, Elections and Referendum 
Act and the 2009 Political Parties and Elections Act (Piccio 2012: 87-88). This evidence 
indicates that one possible reason for the inconclusive results is that the variable capturing 
party law in this study may have been too simplistic. A binary coding likely misses the more 
complex effect of judicial regulation of political parties. As studies on the role of party law 
have noted, legal regulation may also benefit the parties in power as they keep out new 
entrants to the system (Gauja 2014; van Biezen and Rashkova 2014). Thus, just as the formal 
right to judicial review may not be as important as the actual level of judicial activism, the 
simple presence of a party law may be less important than the magnitude of judicial influence 
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on its formation or, even more essential, the frequency of courts interfering with party 
organization on the grounds of party law. 
Taken all factors relating to the status and behavior of the judiciary and judicial 
interference in party organization together and comparing magnitudes of effects, the results 
suggest judicial activism to play the most important role in explaining differences in the level 
of politicization of European judiciaries. Although the findings have to be interpreted 
carefully considering the significance levels, all three effects go in the hypothesized direction, 
providing support for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 4.   
 
Conclusion 
This study has been an attempt to explain the variation in the politicization of the judiciary 
across a set of European countries. To this end, it has investigated the relationship between 
five explanatory factors and the level of politicization of the courts. The empirical results can 
be summarized as follows. The first two factors dealt with the nature of the party system and 
the tradition of government. Countries with less government alternation and a tradition of 
coalition governments were found to have a less politicized judiciary than those with more 
government alternation and a tradition of single-party majority governments. The other three 
explanatory variables dealt with the status and behavior of the judiciary. Applying Lijphart’s 
Index of Judicial Review to the data, the results showed that the more active the courts were, 
the higher the judiciary was found to be politicized. Moreover, countries with an independent 
body for judicial review, i.e. with a centralized system of judicial review, had a more 
politicized judiciary than those without such an institution, i.e. decentralized systems of 
judicial review. Finally, the data showed that the level of politicization of the judiciary was 
higher in countries in which the organization, behavior, and activities of political parties are 
regulated by party law than in those lacking this form of legal regulation. A comparison of 
effect sizes revealed that judicial activism, robust political competition, and the presence of an 
independent body for judicial review seem to play a more important role than the nature of the 
executive and the presence of party law in a country. 
Overall, the empirical results indicate that the opportunity to engage in patronage 
practices in the judiciary and the actual level of political involvement in the appointments of 
judges seem to be related to the behavior and the status of the judiciary in a country. The 
greater the power of the courts and the more active they are in influencing decisions of the 
other branches of government, the more political parties seem to have the incentive to use the 
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judiciary as an organizational resource. Weak judiciaries, in contrast, appear to be less 
attractive for parties in their pursuit of institutional power. 
Although all results except for political competition followed the expected direction of 
the hypotheses, none of the effects of the variables reached a conventional level of statistical 
significance. This has clear methodological reasons. The study has included only 16 European 
countries; thus, the number of observations is very low. Case selection was highly constrained 
by the availability of comparable data on the dependent variable. Politicization is not only 
conceptualized in a number of different ways but also its measurement differs greatly in the 
literature. The Index of Party Patronage is thus an excellent source for comparative studies in 
the field, as it is a collection of individual studies using the same operationalization of the 
variable and the same methods of data collection. Nevertheless, the IPP only covers 16 
European democracies so far, thus limiting the possibilities of statistical analysis and posing a 
challenge to finding significant results. 
In general, therefore, data on the level of politicization of the judiciary in more 
European countries is very desirable. Future scholars may extend the IPP data set of Kopecký 
et al. (2012) by using the same methods to collect data on Belgium, France, Finland, Sweden, 
etc. A larger data set would enable a more robust, multivariate and multilevel statistical 
analysis of the phenomenon including more explanatory factors such as the legal system 
which was excluded from this study due to lack of sufficient variation in the data. Some 
scholars aiming to explain politicization of the bureaucracy include administrative tradition as 
an explanatory factor in their framework (Painter and Peters 2010). Hence, it seems plausible 
that legal traditions, i.e. common vs. civil law systems, may play a role in explaining varying 
levels of politicization of the judiciary.  
Future research may also consider an alternative operationalization of judicial 
activism. Although the Index of Judicial Review by Lijphart (2012) provides an excellent 
indicator of judicial activism, a quantitative data set of actual counts of judicial overturning of 
legislative acts in European countries would complement the picture. So far, such data sets 
only exist for decisions of the US Supreme Court. Moreover, studies may develop a more 
complex and nuanced measurement of the effect of party law. This study has used a binary 
variable representing the presence of a party law or lack thereof. More quantitative data on the 
magnitude of judicial regulation of party organization, e.g. measured by the frequency of 
court decisions related to party law, may shed light on the influence of such legal regulation. 
Finally, longitudinal data may also greatly improve research in the field. Time series 
analysis would be the appropriate technique to make inferences about the causal direction of 
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the relationships and possible lags in the effects of e.g. the adoption of party laws or the 
establishment of constitutional courts. Increasing the number of cross-national and 
longitudinal observations as well as using different measurements of the variables will not 
only help to overcome the methodological limits of this study, but would allow for a closer 
examination of the substantive findings of this analysis and thus for a deeper understanding of 
politicization of the judiciary in general.  
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Appendix: R Script 
getwd() 
 
library(foreign) 
Thesis <- read.spss("Thesis.sav", to.data.frame = TRUE) 
attach(Thesis) 
 
library(ggplot2) 
library(car) 
library(pastecs) 
library(psych) 
library(Hmisc) 
library(compute.es) 
 
round(stat.desc(IPP_Judiciary), 2) 
round(stat.desc(GovAlterIndex), 2) 
table(Nature_Ex) 
table(IndexJudRev) 
table(Party_law) 
table(Const_Court) 
 
#create new dataframe including IPP mean 
mean <- data.frame(CountryNo = NA, Country = "Mean", IPP_Judiciary = 0.32, 
GovAlterIndex = NA, Fractionalization = NA, Nature_Ex = NA, IndexJudRev = 
NA, Party_law = NA, Const_Court = NA, Legal_Cult = NA) 
 
Thesis_new <- rbind(Thesis, mean) 
 
#bar chart of politicization of judiciary by country 
IPP_plot <- ggplot(Thesis_new, aes(x=reorder(Country, IPP_Judiciary), 
y=IPP_Judiciary)) 
IPP_plot + geom_bar(stat = "identity", fill = "lightblue", color="black") + 
coord_flip() + labs(x= "", y="Politicization of the Judiciary") + 
theme_minimal() + geom_text(aes(label = IPP_Judiciary), size = 3, position 
= position_dodge(width = 1), hjust = 1.1) 
 
##Role of robust political competition 
#check relationship with scatterplot 
ScatterComp<-ggplot(Thesis, aes(IPP_Judiciary, GovAlterIndex))  
ScatterComp + geom_smooth(method=lm, color="royalblue", fill="lightblue") + 
labs(x = "Politicization of Judiciary", y = "Political Competition") + 
geom_text(aes(label=Country), size=3.5, hjust = 0.3) + ylim(0.00, 1.0) + 
theme_minimal() 
 
#correlation 
cor.test(IPP_Judiciary, GovAlterIndex, method = "pearson") 
 
##Role of the nature of the executive 
#calculate means by group  
by(IPP_Judiciary, Nature_Ex, stat.desc, basic = FALSE, norm = FALSE) 
 
#create boxplot  
NatureExPlot <- ggplot(Thesis, aes(Nature_Ex, IPP_Judiciary)) 
NatureExPlot + geom_boxplot(fill=c("lightblue", "royalblue"))+ 
labs(x="Tradition of Government", y="Politicization of the Judiciary") + 
theme_minimal() 
 
#test for homogeneity of variance 
leveneTest(IPP_Judiciary ~ Nature_Ex, center=mean, data=Thesis) #p>0.05 -> 
assumption met 
 
27 
 
#t test and effect size 
ind.t.test <- t.test(IPP_Judiciary ~ Nature_Ex, var.equal = TRUE) 
ind.t.test 
 
mes(0.31, 0.37, 0.17, 0.13, 12, 4) #converts raw mean scores into effect 
sizes 
 
###Role of judicial activism 
#calculate means by group  
by(IPP_Judiciary, IndexJudRev, stat.desc, basic = FALSE, norm = FALSE) 
 
#create boxplot 
JudRevPlot <- ggplot(Thesis, aes(IndexJudRev, IPP_Judiciary)) 
JudRevPlot + geom_boxplot(fill=c("lightblue", "deepskyblue", "royalblue", 
"navy"))+ labs(x="Level of Judicial Activism", y="Politicization of the 
Judiciary") + theme_minimal() 
 
#test for homogeneity of variance 
leveneTest(IPP_Judiciary ~ IndexJudRev, center=mean, data=Thesis) #p>0.05 -
> assumption met 
 
#anova 
fit <- aov(IPP_Judiciary ~ IndexJudRev, data=Thesis)  
summary.lm(fit) #p>0.05 -> not significant 
 
#effect sizes 
#absent and weak  
mes(0.13, 0.30, 0.08, 0.18, 2, 7) 
#weak and medium 
mes(0.30, 0.39, 0.18, 0.06, 7, 5) 
#medium and strong 
mes(0.39, 0.42, 0.06, 0.27, 5, 2) 
#absent and strong  
mes(0.13, 0.42, 0.08, 0.27, 2, 2) 
 
## split into only two categories (“low”: absent+weak / “high”: 
medium+strong) 
Thesis$IndexJudRev_new <- IndexJudRev 
Thesis$IndexJudRev_new[Thesis$IndexJudRev_new== "absent"] <- "low" 
Thesis$IndexJudRev_new[Thesis$IndexJudRev_new== "medium"] <- "high" 
 
#calculate means 
by(IPP_Judiciary, Thesis$IndexJudRev_new, stat.desc, basic = FALSE, norm = 
TRUE) 
 
#t-test and effect size 
leveneTest(IPP_Judiciary ~ Thesis$IndexJudRev_new, center=mean, 
data=Thesis) 
ind.t.test <- t.test(IPP_Judiciary ~ Thesis$IndexJudRev_new, var.equal= 
TRUE) 
ind.t.test 
 
mes(0.27, 0.40, 0.18, 0.10, 7, 9) 
 
###Role of presence of an independent body for judicial review 
#calculate means by groups  
by(IPP_Judiciary, Const_Court, stat.desc, basic = FALSE, norm = TRUE) 
 
#create boxplot 
ConstCourtPlot <- ggplot(Thesis, aes(Const_Court, IPP_Judiciary)) 
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ConstCourtPlot + geom_boxplot(fill=c("lightblue", "royalblue"))+ 
labs(x="Independent Body for Judicial Review", y="Politicization of the 
Judiciary") + theme_minimal() 
 
#test for homogeneity of variance 
leveneTest(IPP_Judiciary ~ Const_Court, center=mean, data=Thesis) #p>0.05 -
> assumption met 
 
#t test and effect size 
ind.t.test <- t.test(IPP_Judiciary ~ Const_Court, var.equal = TRUE) 
ind.t.test 
 
table(Const_Court) 
mes(0.26, 0.39, 0.18, 0.12, 8, 8, dig=3) 
 
###Role of party law 
#calculate mean + standard error per group  
by(IPP_Judiciary, Party_law, stat.desc, basic = FALSE, norm = TRUE) 
 
#create boxplot  
PartyLawPlot <- ggplot(Thesis, aes(Party_law, IPP_Judiciary)) 
PartyLawPlot + geom_boxplot(fill=c("lightblue", "royalblue"))+ 
labs(x="Party Law", y="Politicization of the Judiciary") + theme_minimal() 
 
#test for homogeneity of variance 
leveneTest(IPP_Judiciary ~ Party_law, center=mean, data=Thesis) #p>0.05 -> 
assumption met 
 
#t test and effect size 
ind.t.test <- t.test(IPP_Judiciary ~ Party_law, var.equal = TRUE) 
ind.t.test 
 
mes(0.27, 0.35, 0.21, 0.12, 6, 10) 
 
 
 
 
